

Georgia's Post-Rose Revolution Challenges and Civil Society's Response

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Post-Seminar Notes

The Seminar was held under the Chatham House Rules (<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule>), the following is a summary of the sessions

PANEL 1 : CIVIC PARTICIPATION THROUGH ELECTIONS

The ability to change governments and elites through formal processes is essential to political stability. On this, Georgia's record has been mixed. In spite of considerable progress, Georgia has not yet had a formal, democratic transition of power. The recent presidential and parliamentary elections in Georgia were turbulent and characterized by a high degree of political polarization. What, then, are the lessons from recent elections? What do they tell us about politics in Georgia? How has armed conflict and its aftermath affected Georgian governance and what is the role for civil society in the inevitable post-crisis review of events?

Improving Georgia's Electoral Procedures

In 2007, the appointment of Extraordinary Presidential Elections by the President of the country was perceived as one of the best ways to bring the country out of the November 2007 political crisis. Indeed elections are one of the best conflict resolution mechanisms if implemented properly. At that time, Extraordinary Presidential Elections and especially the following Parliamentary Elections strengthened this idea.

However, elections itself are not to be considered as the long term remedy to solve political crisis. They are a long process which involve Pre-election, Election Day and Post-Election, and the implementation of many various activities in a transparent, inclusive and responsive manner in an accordance to internationally recognized and respected standards.

Leading NGOs and civil society representatives identified a variety of factors that have affected the efforts to conduct elections in full compliance with democratic standards. In particular:

- ✓ The issue of impartiality and neutrality of the professional (non-partisan) members of the Election Administration on all levels;
- ✓ Insufficiently transparent performance of the Election Administration;
- ✓ Insufficient efforts made by the Election Administration towards building voters' confidence in the election processes;
- ✓ Making amendments to the Election Code just 2 months before Election Day.

Election Law: The election code of Georgia was adopted in 1999 and since then it has been amended for over 40 times. The amendments are always carried out in a short

period before the Election day, meaning after the date of Election Day is already announced. Each amendment is adapted to the requirements of immediate necessity and lack a long-term strategy. Unfortunately, after so many amendments, the Election code has many contradictory and vague articles that can be interpreted in different ways and, as there are no instructions or a manual for interpreting the code we end up with inconsistent decisions taken by the election administration and the courts.

The Election Code of Georgia should be changed comprehensively. Legislators need to make sure that the process of drafting is maximally inclusive to enable all the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition representatives to be involved in it. A deadline long prior to the election should be set and agreed upon, after which the code should not be changed.

Pre-election period: The Election Code should tighten conditions for participation of public servants in the pre-election campaign; prohibit distribution of material goods by or on behalf of candidates; and finally the laws should draw a clear dividing line between the state and party resources the same way it is in many countries with functioning democracies.

Election Day: Observation revealed more problems during the counting at the PECs rather than during voting. The procedures in the Election code should be streamlined and in some cases further specified (i.e. responsibilities of election administration in considering the complaints, appeals, requirements of video camera recordings etc.); and more trainings should be conducted for members of the middle and lower levels of the Election Administration.

Post-election period: The Post-Election Period of Extraordinary Presidential Elections proved to be the crucial factor in evaluating the elections by many election monitoring organizations. The fact that no complaints were considered by the election administration and by the courts on their merits obliged local election monitoring NGOs to elaborate a new methodology for monitoring the post election process of the Parliamentary elections: the methodology used 24H monitoring of District Election Commissions while tabulating the results. Based on the observation the following recommendations for the legislators were developed:

- terms of appeal over election disputes should be increased;
- the law should streamline procedures for lodging and hearing complaints in the Election Administration;
- there should be a uniform interpretation of the provisions regarding writing complaints and, therefore, such provisions should be revised;
- and finally uniform judicial practice should be formed in connection with election disputes.

Voter education: Voter education is widely conducted by various non-governmental organizations. Last minute changes in the election law hinder proper implementation of this process, especially if the voters' education is conducted for the representatives of national minorities. For this purpose education materials should be prepared in the languages of national minorities and video materials should be disseminated through local media. Special attention should be placed on voter education in election matters of the representatives of national minorities working within the Election Administration. This process should become an area of attention both during and between the election periods.

Voters' lists: NGOs conduct a Voters' Lists' Audit on country representative sample. The findings of the Lists Audit for 2008 are being processed, however based on preliminary results it's generally agreed that considerable effort had been made by the government in order to improve the quality of the voters' lists. Continued efforts should be made to improve update voters' lists on a regular basis. The election code should limit participation of special list subjects (which are moved across the territory of different districts, such as military and police) in majoritarian elections and in the elections of local-self government.

CEC performance: The Central Election Commission of Georgia is a permanent body composed of six "neutral professional" members, and seven members appointed by political parties. The CEC should perform its activities with maximum transparency, the information should be provided to the public in order to build public confidence in the election processes in general and specifically in the work of the Election Administration. CEC's activities should become maximally inclusive meaning that the members appointed by political parties will take active part in the work of the Central Election Commission.

DEC and PEC performance: The composition of the lower level election administrations is similar to the composition of the CEC: six "professional non partisan" members and seven nominated from political parties. As for now there are no real criteria either for selection or for evaluation the members of the District and Precinct election commissions. We believe that the performance of each election administration member should be evaluated in detail and the criteria for evaluation should be formulated and made public beforehand. The public servants of the Election Administration who could not or did not ensure fulfillment of law should be publicly identified and held adequately accountable.

Summary of recommendations:

- ✓ Election code should be changed comprehensively;
- ✓ The amendments to the election code should be carried out long prior to Election Day;
- ✓ All political actors and civil society representatives should be involved in the process of writing new Election Code;
- ✓ Members of the election administration should respect the principle of impartiality;
- ✓ Voter education should aim at reaching out to every voter including representatives of national minorities;
- ✓ Attention should be paid while compiling annex to the voters' lists;
- ✓ All the activities of the election administration should be carried out in a transparent manner.

PANEL 2: LOOKING TOWARDS EUROPE

The countries of the South Caucasus are looking west as they seek to create new economic opportunities and ensure their security. Georgia is particularly engaged. It has concluded an ambitious bilateral Action Plan through the EU's European Neighborhood Policy and wants the promised NATO membership as soon as possible. Likewise, Europe's reactions to the war reflect an increased stake in the stability and

prosperity of Georgia, and the region as a whole. But it has not been a smooth ride in Georgian-EU relations. What are the successes and where are the shortcomings? What is the EU's role in reconstruction and improving civil society? How can EU integration become a more substantive process for Georgia? And how should this involve citizens?

Recalling the early phase of the Caucasian states' rapprochement to European structures:

On their independence, all three South Caucasus countries were admitted to the OSCE. Contact with the Council of Europe started already before the dissolution of Soviet Union. The report presented by the Secretary General of Council of Europe to the Parliamentary Assembly on 13 September 1991 entitled "The Council of Europe and the new sovereign republics of Eastern Europe (doc. 6484)" noted that of the three states in the Caucasus, at least Georgia and Armenia had come out strongly in favour of independence. "While it is somewhat open to dispute whether these republics belong to Europe in a geographical sense", "there have long been important cultural links between Europe and the Caucasian area", said the report. The parliaments of all three states were soon granted special guest status in the Assembly and subsequently applied for full membership. After several years of contacts, dialogues, exchanges and negotiations, Georgia was the first Caucasian country to accede to the Council of Europe. Both the process of preparation and the membership itself proved very productive in promoting institutional and legal reforms in the three countries, e.g. the abolition of capital punishment.

Independence of judiciary, development of democratic institutions based on the Rule of Law is considered as the first priority under EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan. A number of reforms in this direction are under implementation. The main challenges for the reforms – consistency of actions and involvement of civil society:

Georgia is a new democracy, with the challenges which new democracies might face. The EU-Georgia ENP AP included the following major reforms as the first priority:

- *Strengthen rule of law especially through reform of the judicial system, including the penitentiary system, and through rebuilding state institutions.*
- *Strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with international commitments of Georgia.*

The ENP AP is a framework for the reforms of the country.

After the Rose Revolution occurred five years ago, Georgian people demanded sharp changes and changes occurred in a number of areas. Wide-spread, low-level corruption has been eliminated; economic development and public service became more advanced. However, development of the culture of the consultation-based reforms, establishment of the strong democratic institutions with the supremacy of rule of law and independent judiciary are major points of concern for Georgians right now.

There are two major issues: **first**, process of implementation of ENP AP in Georgia and level of involvement from civil society organizations; and **second**, major reform steps for the development of the rule of law based democratic institutions and need for consistency. These are the areas where Georgia needs assistance from its European neighbours.

The implementation of the ENP Action Plan officially started in 2007. The civil sector was actively involved in the process of elaboration of the ENP AP for Georgia in 2005-2007. In September 2005, some 70 civil organizations with support from the Open Society-Georgia Foundation, Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung and Eurasia Foundation, came up with recommendations for the Georgian Government. The Georgian government acted on many of these recommendations when working on the document, which raised the level of civil society's responsibility for and interest in the measures that were taken within the framework of the ENP AP.

In November 2007 civil society organizations with the participation of experts from a number of fields, elaborated a set of specific recommendations for the implementation of the ENP AP - "Civil Society on priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan for Georgia for 2007-2009". This document has been presented to the Georgian Government as well as to the European Commission authorities in Brussels.

Non-paper on strengthening of the civil society dimension of the ENP refers to two major roles of the civil society: *monitoring and dialogue*.

Georgian Civil society organizations do have the capacity to work as independent monitors of the implementation of the reforms and combine this role with the dialogue with the authorities for the effective implementation of the plan. The major problem is combining these two types of activity from the perspective of the government. Government does not have developed system of communication of planning and reporting procedures with the society. National action plans and national reports of implementation are developed without consultation with civil society organisations. Therefore it is difficult for the society to combine two roles: monitoring and participating. There is an apparent need for the involvement from European expertise to develop this culture.

Major reform steps for the **development of the rule of law based democratic institutions** - need for consistency. After August 2008 crisis, it is strategically important for Georgia to strengthen its security capacities with cooperation and assistance from European and Euro-Atlantic partners. It is crucial for the economy to be integrated into European area. At the same time, for the country to be developed into European Democracy it is crucial to build a Rule of law based system with the proper separation of powers, independent judiciary and supremacy of law.

Lack of development of democratic institutions is evident in the **weak status of the Parliament of Georgia**. There should be prompt and effective recommendations (including pre-conditions indicated for further assistance) from the side of European institutions to ensure creation of the real balance of powers for the pluralistic democratic system in Georgia.

Judiciary in Georgia remains as one of the least trusted public institutions despite the ongoing reforms. The courts' impartiality is popularly contested and the judges are believed to be constantly pressured by the executive, especially the prosecution. Several high-profile cases have further tarnished the courts image. The rate of acquittals remains problematic and severe prison overcrowding undermines the basic human rights standards for the inmates.

Recent developments with regard to the judiciary in Georgia have been changes in the Constitution in late 2006, according to which president does not have the right to appoint

judges. The composition of the supreme body of judicial self governance and discipline, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), has been altered diminishing the number of the presidential appointees. Further, the president no longer chairs the HCJ, the president of the Supreme Court assuming this position. This is especially important since the HCJ is the body appointing all lower court judges.

Despite these important constitutional changes, there is still a need for the High council of Justice of Georgia to act as an independent body and to ensure disciplinary proceedings against judges conducted on the grounds of fairness. These reform steps unfortunately are planned and carried out without proper consultations with wide society, legal community and civil society organizations.

Lack of public trust towards judiciary is one of the major problems in Georgia. A clear illustration of the inconsistent reform steps are the decisions of 2006 and 2007 with this regard. On the one hand, Parliament amended the constitution and (as described above) transferred major powers from the president to HCJ, thus providing formal independence to the system and positive message to society. However, it was apparent from the beginning that this message would not be enough. Opinion polls of 2007 indicated dramatic lack of trust from the side of the public towards the judiciary. Despite this reality, by May 2007 Parliament amended legislation and restricted camera and audio recordings inside the court rooms. Although accepted in a number of western European democracies, with a major lack of trust in Georgia this reform step has been criticized by civil society organizations as counterproductive. As well-known British dictum provides: *“justice not only must be done, it must be seen to be done”*

Reform of **the penitentiary** is included in the ENP AP under the first ENP AP priority. Poor conditions in penitentiary institutions and extensive overcrowding are major problems. The number of inmates has been growing from 2003 dramatically (in 2003 there were 8000 inmates and by the first half of 2008 around 21 000). European Commission report on implementation of ENP AP for 2007 indicates - “A new prison was opened in Tbilisi in 2007 and prison facilities were refurbished to address the significant shortcomings regarding prison overcrowding and detention conditions. Nonetheless, in the face of an ever-increasing prison population, resulting from the “zero tolerance for crime” policy, urgent measures are needed to increase the use of alternatives to pre-trial custody, alternatives to imprisonment as a punishment for crime and to develop probation and parole systems, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT).”

Georgian civil society is seeking European integration for a European democracy, security and rule of law based system. Lack of consultation-based processes and consistent reforms steps might hinder these aspirations. It is evident that for the further development of reforms, comprehensive strengthening of the ENP AP for Georgia is essential. This process should pro-actively include civil society actors to ensure creation of the culture of participation and raise public trust towards the reforms.

Challenges to integrating with European Union systems:

The Government that came into power in Georgia after the Rose Revolution has introduced a number of important reforms, especially in the economic field. The European Neighbourhood Policy also has proved to be a significant transformation tool. Tangible results have been obtained in many fields. Some of the challenges ahead are:

- **poverty reduction:** more work needs to be done in order to avoid poverty persisting to such a great extent in spite of the reforms;
- the Georgian **labor code** has to be brought in line with ILO standards in order for Georgia to be eligible for an extension of the GSP+ scheme in the trade field;
- the Georgian government and parliament ought to pay more attention to the reports of the Georgian **ombudsman:** his criticism concerning the human rights situation needs to be taken seriously.

The EU is envisaging various ways of enhancing further the integration process with Georgia; it would like to introduce a **visa facilitation** agreement without delay, and it is also in favour of starting negotiations on a **Free Trade Agreement**. Sweden and Poland have taken the initiative of concluding an **Eastern Partnership**, aiming at bringing added value to the already existing EU-Georgia cooperation formats and moving more rapidly ahead towards Georgia's integration into EU systems.

PANEL 3: CONFLICT AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING: ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Following on the heels of Kosovo's declaration of independence, and NATO's recent promise of eventual membership, the situation in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia erupted into open armed conflict in August. Most recently, Russia recognized the independence of these territories. So how should we evaluate what has happened and in what are ways that civil society contribute to a constructive future?

Two major conditions have been observed with regard to conflict resolution:

(1) August war has shifted the key parameters and main underlying assumptions in the approach towards the unresolved conflicts. Whether we like it or not, things are not going to be quite the same again.

(2) Anyone involved in the conflict resolution processes must understand the *long-term* nature of those processes and how slowly they work. That is obviously not a message or a reality that goes down well in the region for parties on either side of the conflict divide. The slow pace and even, at times, practical gridlock merely have added to the sense of impatience and frustration among many constituencies in the region.

It is an uncomfortable and inconvenient truth that what happened in August 2008 has now further set back any satisfactory outcome. No progress is likely now in the short or medium term, or possibly longer.

However, both these (unpalatable) facts highlight even more the crucial importance of the kind of role civil society can and should play in trying to find fresh ways to address these situations. There is a key need, admittedly from a very low base indeed, to try and build some basic elements of trust.

Trust and confidence are now at the lowest points they have been, and for understandable reasons; ultimately progress here can only be achieved by establishing reliable patterns of behavior on either side. That can merely strike as easy words in the current situation that fail to take account of what is a febrile and traumatised environment. No one, least of all in the international community, would seek to

underestimate the sheer scale of the tasks that now face us all, inside and outside the region.

The post-war situation brings a number of major challenges at all levels - and not least in the humanitarian sphere:

The issue of the more than 100,000 IDPs or refugees displaced as a result of the conflict has to be a priority concern, especially with the approach of winter. Due tribute should be paid to what has already been done by multilateral and bilateral efforts and the Georgian government. But much more remains to be done.

The focus of attention is clearly now on the situation around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. What, for example, does recognition by Russia actually mean? It is a declaration which certainly raises more questions than answers. Presentationally, it is labeled as recognition; but in substance it is more a move towards absorption or annexation. The implications from this will be lengthy and complex and offer no clear way ahead. These will be key concerns for us all. However, it is important also to keep a close eye on the situation affecting minorities in Georgia - whether in Samtskhe-Javakheti or Kvemo-Kartli. The approach Tbilisi continues to take towards its minorities will be an important indicator and marker for the kind of inclusive and cohesive society Georgia is ultimately striving to create.

Fourteen years of negotiation, led alternately by the UN and Russia did not resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts or prevent war. Is the only way forward now to emphasize confidence building and cooperation in areas where there are realistic opportunities?

Context has comprehensively changed. Worst case scenarios have materialized – threat of violence has turned into mass violence and in any conflict violence always has a transformative impact, usually more negative than positive. There are many changes but there are also very tough questions to be asked as to whether the dividends gained from the changes are worth the cost – Georgia has succeeded in internationalizing the peace process but is it nearer to its objective? And is the west taking over and essentially allowing Georgia to relinquish responsibility for its own behavior?

Confidence Building as an Idea. Confidence building has long been marginalised from the political level conflict resolution processes in Georgia – not withstanding the efforts of the UN and OSCE to engage the parties in measures that could build trust. Confidence building work has been alive and kicking in a myriad of civil society initiatives – but these have struggled to assert influence over the political discourse. It has been very interesting to hear critiques saying that civil society peacebuilding or conflict transformation work has failed in the wake of what has now happened. While this work has not achieved its global goal of transforming the conflicts, it has created cross conflict relationships of mutual respect and a willingness to cooperate that even now has survived the hostilities of the past month; relationships that one day will be the social glue on which transformed societies can be built. What has failed is official diplomacy and an approach to conflict settlement, not resolution, driven by geo-politics and positional military confrontation.

What do we need to do:

- Learn from past peacemaking effort.

- Do not squeeze the space for civic engagement
- Rhetoric of force and the threat of force has failed in such a ridiculous and tragic fashion it needs to be removed from the agenda
- Inclusive formats – voices that represent constituencies, however unpalatable, have to be heard and respected in order to be engaged with. Marginalizing them promotes antagonism and violence. Existing networks and relationships need to be nurtured and promoted.
- Extraordinary information war – not just in Russia but also in Georgia. There is a very real danger of a pernicious revisionism in assessing how the conflict arose and what happened.
- Danger of the flood of new actors and flood of donor money drowning existing initiatives and relations.
- Consultative mechanisms to encourage real debate on key substantive issues (danger of debate being high-jacked by party political positions): how to facilitate a “big conversation” in Georgian society that is not partisan?
- Addressing human rights concerns
 - Mechanisms to investigate what happened
 - Danger of rumors and inflammatory propaganda
 - Dealing with past legacies – earlier phases of the conflict
 - Need for processes that deal with what has happened at both emotional and judicial levels
- Humanitarian crisis
 - Interim solutions that treat people with dignity
 - Integration better prepares people for return
 - Can responses to the humanitarian crisis be used to cross the divide or will they entrench the divide? Sri Lanka or Aceh post Tsunami?
- Psycho-social dynamics
 - Dealing with trauma – Georgian society has in some ways been traumatized by what Russia has done, but we should not forget that Abkhaz and South Ossetian societies have endured trauma over an extended period.
 - Creation of societies in which people feel they belong and have a stake irrespective of identity background
- Confidence building
 - Can bilateral relations be sustained?
 - Urgent need to reach out beyond those who have engaged for years
 - Patience: there remains a danger of rhetoric raising unrealistic expectations

Concluding thoughts

- Recognition is not resolution
- Peace is not possible if it is simply the preserve of elites – political leaders are the ones to sign agreements, but agreements are not worth the paper they are written on if they are not acceptable to societies, and in the South Caucasus rather than preparing societies for compromises inherent in mutually acceptable peace, leaders persist in ratcheting up levels of antagonism and enmity.
- Civil societies in the region remain fragile and certainly will not “bring peace” but at the same time without the efforts of civic actors to challenge taboos, broaden horizons and cross boundaries to engage with the perceived enemy (despite the risks this entails in terms of being accused of betraying national interest back home) there is little hope that new relationships can be forged.

- It is clear that the alienation between peoples, the lack of awareness of the lives of others, is intensifying. People living on the ground in Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot envisage how they can live within a Georgian state any longer: talk of reconciliation can easily be perceived as preaching a pernicious and alien religion at the present time and the ‘international community’ needs to be very wary about how it engages. New divides are being entrenched:
- Risk of a new cold war rhetoric
 - Georgian attitudes to Russia
 - Abkhaz/SO – lost faith in the impartiality of Europe (US – a long time ago)
- If confidence building is seen only in the light of the provision of technical skills or good will of citizens then it will be a crop sown on very infertile land – technical capacity has to go hand in hand with a willingness of state strategy to be based upon the notion that confidence and mutual respect are an integral part of a conflict transformation process.
- Conflict transformation is a far from monolithic task – it demands creative and multifaceted approaches working at different levels of society and empowering a range of actors to take responsibility for what change could look like in their own societies.

Georgia after the Russian invasion: vision and concerns

- Much has been said and reported, although not always correctly, about the roots of the conflict that brings us back to 20th century’s political cannibalism in Soviet Union; to the policies and strategies aimed at provoking conflicts, destruction of centuries-old communities and cohabitation; cracking down unique, balanced social systems and occupying big parts of the territory of a sovereign country and forcing out approximately half a million people from their homes.
- It is imponderable how it came that in the 21st century a country that had committed itself to Helsinki Final Act and aspires to establish strategic partnership with the European Union unleashed unprecedented military power against its much smaller neighbor, thus punishing it for its choice to integrate into euro-atlantic systems. But it happened - Georgia has become a victim of a brutal, blind military power aiming at not only challenging its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also shaping a new world order in which the international norms and law are void. “Legitimate sphere of our interests” – it has been said about Georgia. This approach was used as one of the pre-texts for the invasion. This kind of thinking endangers international system of relations, based on plural democracy and freedom of choice.
- For decades the small nation has been oppressed by soviet regime and was in permanent fight for its freedom and liberal values resulting in reinforcement of its aspirations in early 90s and recently in 2003. Cautious steps of Georgia’s western partners throughout 90s and their reluctance to share responsibility for the developments in the near neighborhood allowed unfair, biased and flawed formats for conflict settlement to emerge. The People of Georgia and its foreign partners had not supported the democratic reforms just to watch it die from neglect.
- The EU’s concept of Wider Europe and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the Common Vision of the countries allied in the Community of Democratic Choice are in conflict with notions of a Wider Russia. Western and Russian perceptions and policies are at odds with each other in the whole area stretching from the Baltic States to the Black Sea.

- We all understand that in today's globalized world interdependence is the driving force behind economic and institutional success, however we also have to realize that partnership and cooperation should be based on reciprocity and condoning violence will end up in unpredictable future.
- What we face in Georgia right now is a brutal attempt to legitimize ethnic cleansing committed by a small group of separatist criminals backed by a powerful state still thinking in the terms of Cold War and zones of influence. For decades predominantly ethnic Georgian refugees and IDPs have been deprived of their fundamental rights to return and property. Numerous efforts by the UNHCR recognizing IDPs rights to return and urging regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali to ensure duly return in dignity and security haven't borne fruits because of resistance from the CIS, actually Russian, so called Peacekeepers capitalizing on reluctance from the international community to push for adherence to universal rights. Over 400000 being forced out from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia in early 90s; now additional 130.000 peaceful population of Georgian villages experience the same harassment and humiliation from separatist militia and Russian soldiers. Satellite Imaginary Reports and conclusions of prominent international human rights organizations provide irrefutable evidence of targeted attacks against Georgian population. Georgian villages were burnt down, people executed in front of their family members and young men and women crammed into trucks and transported to Tskhinvali and Russian Federation for slave labor.
- We very much acknowledge and praise efforts of the EU presidency and President Sarkozy's personal engagement in bringing about cease-fire in our country. We do remain loyal and committed to six-point-document and call on the Russian Federation to adhere to the principles stipulated in the document and attached protocols and correspondence to it.
- Government of Georgia is ready to cooperate with international humanitarian organizations and facilitate their activities in the region based on mutual understanding and respect of our territorial integrity.